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Accompany your young child on your journey through Penn Station, and you’ll discover the need for various explanations. As we traversed the Long Island Railroad terminal, my son was puzzled by the immediate vicinity of three eateries centered on chicken—Chick-fil-A, Raising Cane’s, and Pollo Campero—and by the circumstance that a locale dubbed Gotham News seemed principally devoted to vending sweets and bottled water. He also sought clarity on why some individuals, as they walked or idled, drank from containers enclosed in brown paper. “Why do they utilize those sacks?” was his query.
Where does one commence? Brown bagging embodies one of those societal customs that persists in feeling illogical even after elucidation. As is broadly understood, the intent is that the receptacles obscure the liquid being ingested, enabling imbibers and law enforcement to disregard restrictions against partaking of alcohol in public areas. Naturally, the sacks do not genuinely conceal anything; indeed, they are designated solely for, and unmistakably signal, the ingestion of spirits. (It would never cross your mind to savor a bottle of Fiji water situated within a paper sack.) Articulated explicitly, the rationale is peculiar. The drinkers acknowledge that the officers acknowledge their drinking, and the officers acknowledge that the drinkers acknowledge their awareness. However, the officers feign ignorance, whilst retaining the prerogative to abruptly “notice” the activity, should an individual become unruly. Concurrently, abstainers benefit from a railway hub that projects a more refined aura than its actual state.
These curious whirls of convoluted reasoning cannot exemplify our typical cognitive processes; surely human dealings are generally more forthright. Yet this constitutes precisely the supposition that Steven Pinker challenges in his latest literary work, “When Everyone Knows That Everyone Knows . . . : Common Knowledge and the Mysteries of Money, Power, and Everyday Life.” The enigma of who-knows-who-knows-what, perpetually appealing to devotees of crime narratives and espionage stories, has historically engrossed psychologists and theorists of games. “As a scientist of cognition, I have committed my existence to contemplating how individuals think,” Pinker pens. “Therefore, the apex of my inquisitiveness would have to reside in how individuals perceive what others perceive, and how they perceive what others perceive they perceive, and how they perceive what others perceive they perceive they perceive.” Such recurring thought cycles, Pinker posits, are not merely mental exercises for specialists; they represent a cornerstone of our way of life.
“Common knowledge” frequently serves as our descriptor for those concepts or truths that we collectively grasp: for example, the Pledge of Allegiance, or the definition of LOL. However, Pinker advocates a more specific conception. Common knowledge, he clarifies, is not solely what we know but what we know is known by all. It diverges from “shared knowledge,” which is possessed by numerous individuals but not publicly. Should you possess awareness that the sovereign is unclothed, and I similarly possess such awareness, that constitutes shared knowledge: neither of us can ascertain the other’s cognizance. Conversely, should I hold certainty that you know, and you hold certainty that I know, that cognizance is widespread between us. “When the young boy declared the sovereign to be nude, he imparted no information that was not already known by all,” Pinker articulates. Still, “by voicing aloud what every observer could discern”—Pinker mentions expressions such as “reveal a secret,” or disclosing something “out there”—he transformed the sovereign’s nudity into common knowledge, a shift sufficient to alter everyone’s perception of the sovereign “from servile respect to mockery and contempt.”
The anecdote of the sovereign sans attire illustrates how common knowledge fosters united action. Every individual within the empire recognizes the sovereign to be an imbecile—yet, paradoxically, no individual desires to hazard criticizing him. It devolves into a scenario of individual self-preservation. This is what game theorists designate a coördination quandary. Should all act in unison, rebellion would prove feasible, but when individuals function independently, they confront retribution; more critically, they possess motivation to operate against the collective welfare, such as by informing on one another or by negating reality amongst themselves. Once the sovereign’s nudity attains the status of common knowledge, however, the coördination quandary finds resolution.
Existence abounds with coördination quandaries addressed through common knowledge, Pinker asserts. In the most elementary illustrations, two individuals attempting to navigate a confined doorway concurrently can coördinate with amplified efficacy if they knowingly embrace shared conventions concerning which individual should be granted precedence. (They might acknowledge their consensus that priority is assigned to whichever individual arrived earliest, or to whichever individual occupies a superior position, or to “ladies first.”) Within America, it is common knowledge that driving occurs on the right, not the left. Upon perusing Pinker, I reflected on how, within New York City, it is common knowledge that pedestrians frequently await crossing by positioning themselves in the road, as opposed to upon the curb. Urban drivers acknowledge the necessity of accounting for this practice, and pedestrians acknowledge their cognizance, and vice versa. Attempt this in alternative locales, and you gamble with your well-being.
Extensive groups of individuals, Pinker elucidates, frequently resolve the coördination quandary of maintaining coherence by nurturing convictions that are “widely accepted but not readily verifiable.” Pinker cites a conviction on the American right “that the 2020 presidential election was fraudulently obtained” and the perspective “among the youthful educated left” that “gender identity is unrelated to biological sex.” It is precisely due to the contentious and nonobvious nature of such concepts—they markedly diverge from affirming “that the sun ascends in the east,” Pinker writes—that they function as trustworthy indicators of group affiliation. Should an individual convey a belief in Pizzagate, one can be reasonably assured of their adherence to numerous associated convictions, and coördination may commence.
Such notions permit individuals who are essentially disparate to perceive similarity. Common knowledge is afforded profound gravity; it evolves into a gauge of belonging and a propellant of division. It molds the trajectory of society and impacts us individually. Nevertheless, within Pinker’s evaluation, it shares substantial characteristics with more benign beliefs and customs, such as the regulations of road usage. For enthusiasts of “KPop Demon Hunters,” it is an article of conviction that the vocalist EJAE embodies generational talent by virtue of her exceptional vocal capacity, which appears to encompass two and a half octaves; within MAGA, it is common knowledge that the radical left endeavors to instill gender ideology within children; within particular cohorts of artificial-intelligence researchers, all are cognizant that all anticipate a superintelligence to imminently seize global dominion. How might existence undergo alteration should we perceive such convictions not as notions inherently compelling but as uniquely efficacious resolutions to coördination quandaries?
Should individuals seeking collaborative endeavors cultivate common knowledge, they additionally supervise, suppress, and circumvent it, both to uphold group solidarity and to evade association with individuals they disfavor. The members of a religious community might castigate heretics who contest common knowledge; through this process, they occasionally generate opportunities for individuals to affirm their membership within the group by contributing to the act of retribution. The expansion of the mob amplifies the belief that all believe in the dogma. (Pinker argues that this dynamic underlies cancel culture.) “The innermost members surrounding a senile leader might behave as though normality prevails”; conceivably, those within the inner circle seek to forestall mutual cognizance of his senility (all are cognizant of it) from transforming into common knowledge (all are cognizant that all are cognizant of it). Similarly, when an erratic leader issues autocratic pronouncements, his acolytes might insist that he is “merely jesting.” One might assert that they are concealing the beer within a brown container.
Yet, within alternative circumstances, the circumvention of common knowledge may manifest subtly, even agreeably. Consider two individuals who share mutual fondness: they might orchestrate rendezvous whilst preserving the non-emergence of their reciprocal attraction into common knowledge. (Two companions can partake in a hike, correct?) The element of concealment surrounding the pair might augment the interpersonal energy between them—or furnish concealment should the enthusiasm wane. Pinker recounts an episode of “Seinfeld” wherein George recounts a recent date to Jerry and Elaine. “She extends an invitation for me to visit her residence at midnight, ostensibly ‘for coffee,’ ” George recalls. “And I decline. ‘No, I appreciate the offer. I have no desire for coffee. It has a stimulating effect upon me. It is excessively late for me to ingest coffee.’ I conveyed these sentiments to her. Individuals of such diminished intellect should be barred from continued existence!” Why did his date not adopt a more explicit approach to her proposition? Pinker ultimately characterizes this variety of indirectness as affording “plausible deniability of common knowledge.” George understands the desired culmination of the evening, and presumably so does she, but her performed unawareness furnishes both parties with an opportunity to de-escalate. Feigning mere friendship may prove advantageous.
Within still further scenarios, deficiencies in common knowledge may incapacitate individuals with a critical need for collaboration. Within the program “Couples Therapy,” the psychoanalyst Orna Guralnik urges the participants in a couple to supplant their individual viewpoints concerning their disagreements with a shared comprehension of the emerging difficulties. She assists them in cultivating this comprehension and frequently requests that they expound upon it to one another to ensure unequivocal mutual awareness of the unfolding circumstances. “It presents you with a rather transparent depiction of the requisite course of action,” she informs a typical couple, subsequent to summarizing their issues. The sole outstanding inquiry pertains to the couple’s volition to act upon their established cognizance.
Upon scrutinizing the condition of the nation, one might ponder whether an issue has arisen with our common knowledge. Pinker delineates the manner in which social platforms have reformed the dynamics of our collective cognizance. Within the online realm, he articulates, “the communications feel akin to common knowledge, at a minimum amongst the individuals of consequence to you,” and one is invited to contribute to the genesis of that knowledge via expressions of approval, reposting, or alternative indications of shared awareness of the generally acknowledged information. Novel avenues for the formation of common knowledge ceaselessly manifest within our feeds, and, consequently, Pinker argues, we currently allocate excessive temporal and energetic resources to the rituals of affirmation and expulsion entailed by its fabrication. How may we decelerate these processes? One potential avenue entails, generally, disengagement from social milieus that appear excessively invested in prescribing the thoughts of individuals similar to ourselves. Similarly, we ought to exercise augmented circumspection in embracing convictions that prioritize categorization over imparting information.
Numerous technologies are predicated upon the not-unreasonable premise that transparency is salutary and that an augmentation of common knowledge is advantageous. “The evolutionary specialization of Homo sapiens lies within extensive interdependence,” Pinker observes. Our attainment of our current status as a species derives from collaborative efforts within progressively larger collectives. “If common knowledge is indispensable for coördination,” he proceeds, then “why not dispense with the pretense” and embrace an ethos of “unadulterated candor” and comprehensive transparency? The “argument against pursuing this course,” according to Pinker’s perspective, essentially posits that common knowledge lacks exclusive intrinsic value; it serves as a mechanism toward an objective. It exists to facilitate our unification, and specific revelations, if exposed, may engender disintegration.
The internet was formerly perceived widely as a species of coöperation apparatus poised to facilitate collaboration and coördination on unprecedented scales. Analysts discoursed regarding “astute aggregations” and “the sagacity of multitudes.” Subsequent to this period, we have cultivated heightened awareness of the menaces posed by disinformation, reverberation chambers, and viral dissemination. However, Pinker’s literary work assesses these apprehensions from a disparate vantage point. He elucidates that the origination, propagation, avowal, and negation of common knowledge surpass the boundaries of our understanding in complexity. Our objective transcends the mere amplification of common knowledge. Rather, within traditional societal existence, we advance judiciously, disclosing particular details and concealing others to meticulously govern our affiliations. We occasionally lead dual or triple existences—possessing cognizance yet feigning ignorance, or recognizing that others recognize our cognizance yet refuting our acknowledgment of their cognizance. Operating with incomplete awareness may engender a sense of peculiarity, yet we persist due to the convoluted nature of the world and our necessity for flexibility.
Indeed, one might contend that the internet functions less as a coöperation apparatus than as a mechanism for the articulation of sentiment. And although the accelerated articulation of sentiment may aid coördination, it may also undermine it. Within the online domain, we more promptly formulate judgments regarding individuals’ thoughts and more readily demonstrate our concurrence or dissent, circumventing the intricacies of common knowledge. In summation, it mirrors the Tinder-ization of society, wherein a complex social interaction is supplanted by the swift simplicity of affirmative or negative swiping. Reclaiming a subtle approach to common knowledge within a realm deprived of subtlety will prove challenging. ♦
Sourse: newyorker.com
